A better understanding of European Works Council networks: the case of BMW and GM by Whittall, M. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/78644
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.

  
European Works Councils in complementary perspectives 281 
                                                
Chapter 10 
A better understanding of European Works 
Council networks: the case of BMW and GM 
 
Michael Whittall, Herman Knudsen and Fred Huijgen 
10.1. Introduction 
Research into European works councils (EWC) appears to be going through 
a period of revitalisation. Prior to, and directly after of the passing of the 
European works council directive (EWCD) in 1994, this new institution 
caught the imagination of many industrial sociologists across the breadth 
and width of Europe. In the early to mid-1990s the focus was very much on 
questions of coverage and the content of agreements. This was closely 
followed by a growing interest in how such bodies functioned, or rather did 
not function, towards the late 1990s. With the arrival of a new millennium, 
however, a marked decline in EWC interest was to be observed. The gusto 
with which researchers had welcomed the arrival of EWCs was replaced by 
new research fads. We would argue in fact that a mood prevailed for a time, 
most noticeable at conferences, in which academics were somewhat 
relieved at the passing of research into EWC, i.e. “there’s more to life than 
EWCs”! 
In the last years, though, we detect once again a growing interest in this 
European institution. In addition to the publication of various books and 
reports (Whittall et al. 2007; Kotthoff 2006; Telljohann 2006; Carley and 
Hall 2006), a number of conferences and workshops have recently been 
devoted to the EWC (Brussels (Belgium) 2007; Arezzo (Italy) 2007; 
Bochum (Germany) 2007; Warsaw (Poland) 2006).1 Offering a definitive 
reason for this revitalisation is certainly beyond us and as with most things 
one should not exclude the role of chance. However, we suspect that the 
return of EWCs to the research agenda is closely linked to the interconnected 
 
1  The following conferences and seminars devoted to the EWC were organised by the Euro-
pean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Poland (2006), 
European Trade Union Institute in Brussels (2007), the Istituto per il Lavoro in Arezzo 
(2007) and Bochum University in Bochum (2007). 
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issues of restructuring and employee voice in a period of unprecedented 
globalisation and Europeanisation. As these economic and political 
developments place in question, what Hyman (2007) calls the “autonomy” 
of national actors (trade unions, employers and the state) and hence their 
ability and interest in regulating employment terms and conditions, 
alternative approaches need to be considered. With national industrial 
relations increasingly at odds with capital’s “transferability agenda”, 
particularly the latter’s ability to hold labour to ransom with the threat of 
exporting jobs to perceived more economically viable regions (as recently 
occurred at AEG Nuremberg, Artus 2006), it would therefore be 
irresponsible to ignore initiatives that “potentially” offer solutions to social 
dumping. 
The current empirical interest in EWCs, clearly an extension of earlier 
work, appears predominantly concerned with understanding how to improve 
the internal workings of EWCs. Not wishing to go over old trodden ground, 
often referred to as the Euro-pessimist and Euro-optimist debate in which 
protagonists discuss the importance of such a body empowered with mere 
information and consultation rights, the fact remains that few examples 
prevail in which EWCs have had a noticeable positive impact (Carley and 
Hall 2006). By positive impact we are referring to instances in which the 
EWC has been involved in the regulation of employment, i.e. supra-
nationally taking on the mantle of structures preformed traditionally within 
national industrial relations systems such as works councils and industry 
level collective bargaining.2 
This chapter is intended as a contribution to research studying the internal 
workings of EWCs. To this end we focus particular on the EWC as a 
network, defined as a structure that can potentially bring together actors 
geographically dispersed. Certainly, the EWC network, irrespective of the 
degree of intensity and quality, supports communication between employee 
representatives in the same undertaking. We argue, however, that there is a 
requirement to move away from the loose reference to network, a catch-all 
term which attempts to explain everything but actually explains very little. 
Although the term is increasingly, either directly or indirectly, mentioned in 
conjunction with EWCs (Whittall 2007; Knudsen et al. 2007; Pulignano 
2006; Kotthoff 2006; Martinez and Walker 2005), the fact remains that a 
 
2  We acknowledge here that there is an interesting debate, often referred to as the varieties of 
capitalism debate, which suggests that national industrial relations systems have been able to 
adapt to the new political and economic circumstances. Hence it would be premature of us to 
talk of their total demise. 
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conceptual understanding of the application of the network concept remains 
underdeveloped to the best of our knowledge. Too often authors, and here 
we include ourselves; seem to take for granted the network metaphor, a 
reference that denotes nothing more than the mastering of space and time. 
This especially appears a major weakness of current research on EWCs, an 
inability to acknowledge that the “shape” of a network influences the 
overall character of a EWC and so in turn the ability of this European body 
as we shall argue to act collectively. 
Central to our argument then is the suggestion that researchers need to be 
more specific when referring to the EWC as a network. As we will show the 
character/shape of a EWC network will ultimately determine whether this 
European institution can develop a sense of a common identity, a quality 
which we have shown in our previous work is essential if the EWC is to 
become a structure that can challenge managerial decisions (Knudsen et al. 
2007). 
We begin by offering the reader an insight into how researchers can better 
define the EWC network. To this end we specifically draw on the work of 
Bavelas (1950) who argues that a network’s “shape” influences the nature 
of communication within a network, or as we suggest the intensity and 
transparency of a EWC, two factors we claim that ultimately determine 
whether the EWC develops a collective identity. This is followed by 
research undertaken on the BMW and GM EWCs, two examples of quite 
different EWC networks and hence two quite different responses when 
faced by major periods of restructuring. Respectively the chapter 
specifically focuses on the break-up of the BMW-Rover Group in 2000, and 
the closure of GM’s Azambuja plant in 2006. 
10.2. EWC network and the question of identity 
The network has become a key metaphor in understanding social 
developments in modern society. Of course, this is not to deny the presence 
of networks in previous historical periods. On the contrary networks have 
always been an important quality of human existence, a tool through which 
actors can structure relations. The difference to the past being, however, that 
today’s networks are able with the use of modern technology to reach 
further a field. Hence, defined as a structure composed of communication 
points, so-called nodes and these in turn connected by communication 
paths, ties, the EWC contains a key composite of a modern network 
structure. It represents an ability to allow actors to enter into discourse 
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irrespective of distance and time. Undoubtedly, the EWC-Directive 
represents the legal acknowledgement that the political and economic 
developments within the European Union have ensured that nationally 
focussed networks are becoming increasingly ineffective in managing 
employee relations. The main task of the EWC, therefore, involves bridging 
such a distance, in short a re-embedding of a system of industrial relations 
at a European level. This though would involve the EWC addressing 
labour’s Achilles heel, geographical fixity, i.e. a horizontal outlook 
underpinned by parochial tendencies. The EWC, made up of various nodes 
and ties (employee representatives within the company headquarters, 
employee representatives in foreign subsidiaries, national trade union 
officers and European industrial trade union federations), represents an 
organisational attempt to coordinate labour activities at where it 
increasingly counts, at a supranational level according to Pulignano (2006). 
However, experience shows that many EWCs find it difficult to live up to 
the high expectations of many commentators and practitioners, EWCs to 
often symbolic of a body referred to by the German sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies (1972) as a Gesellschaft (society). Seen from this perspective 
membership to the EWC involves is very much a utilitarian act, you sign up 
to the EWC to further the interests of your plant/country. Where relations to 
other delegates exist, these predominantly exist to glean information about 
developments within the company as a whole and to lobby management on 
behalf of one’s plant/country as against a platform for developing a 
common EWC position. Though occasional acts of support between the 
different EWC nodes should not be excluded, such acts of solidarity, if we 
can call them these, involve one major precondition, they must not involve 
sacrifice on the part of the supporter (Whittall 2003, 2007). The position of 
EWC delegates here can be summed up as follows: “Yes we will support 
you in whatever way we can, but our actions cannot threaten the jobs here.” 
Of course, Tönnies developed another major concept, the notion of a 
Gemeinschaft (community), which if applied to an EWC assumes that 
delegates can be motivated by non-instrumentalist interests. In this sense 
EWC delegates develop a sense of common identity, a sense of 
togetherness, which though no guarantee to unlimited sacrifice, is 
undoubtedly far more sustainable than EWCs in which membership is first 
and foremost an instrumental act. The EWC characteristic of a 
Gemeinschaft, implies a common identity can emerge, and because of this 
delegates from the various nodes are willing to empower this European 
structure with the right of authority usually bestowed on national industrial 
relations institutions. 
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The question that remains to be answered is what factors can contribute to a 
EWC surpassing the Gesellschaft stage in its development, which as 
existing research suggests is the predominant characteristic of most EWCs. 
As noted above we contend that one key influencing factor concerns the 
shape of a EWC’s network. To further understand the argument promoted 
here we will now turn to consider more deeply the notion of communication 
networks as developed by Alex Bavelas (1950). 
Communication networks 
Communication Networks, a concept widely attributed to the work of Alex 
Bavelas (1950), offers a means of classifying the shape of a network, the 
classification of which can help indicate the overall character of the 
network. In the case of EWCs such a tool can be applied to discern which 
network shape can best facilitate a Gemeinschaft EWC or alternatively 
factors which ensure this European body does not develop beyond a 
structure which is viewed as mainly promoting the interests individual 
nodes. Although there are many aspects of Bavelas’ work on 
communication flows which we find informative, the part of his work which 
touches on the issues of leadership and the involvement of network 
members is of particular relevance to this chapter. This brings us to one of 
our key assertions, that delegates of EWCs and the people they represent 
will identify, that is buy into the EWC idea only if a number prerequisites 
can be assured by the network. The first involves the EWC being a 
democratic edifice, i.e. a body which ensures that delegates are involved in 
determining the course the EWC is heading, in short the ability to set the 
agenda. This is of particular importance considering that an EWC represents 
a network of nodes strewn across the European Economic Area, the 
successful co-ordination of which will influence whether the EWC becomes 
a body able to influence central management decisions. The second factor, 
one linked closely to the first, involves interaction between the different 
nodes. Though this is primarily the task of the coordinator based at the hub 
of the network, this represents what we refer to as “indirect interaction”, the 
coordinator a portal through which information flows. Such interaction, 
though, needs to be complimented by direct interaction, be it by utilizing 
information communication technologies or face-to face contact. This is 
because the international nature of EWCs, and with this we mean the often 
contrasting if not conflicting industrial relations systems, are not factors 
which naturally lend themselves to high trust relations between delegates 
(Whittall 2000, 2003). Moreover, such a situation can produce competition 
between EWC delegates over employee representative practices. In 
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addition, such a situation is compounded by the fact that management are in 
a strong position to exploit the potential parochialism of labor through 
regime competition. For this reason we assert that an EWC network that 
promotes greater interaction between the various nodes is in a better 
position to develop trust relations between delegates. 
In discussing and analysing different communication flows within networks 
Bavelas referred to various different communication flows. These include 
the star, chain, wheel and circle. The networks described by Bavelas (1950) 
are marked by different degrees of centrality – the extreme cases being that 
of the chain which depicts a top-down communication flow and the circle 
marked by a low level of centrality. For this chapter we will focus on the 
star and circle network shapes. Our choice is premised by the fact that 
EWCs allow for a two-way communication process, they are not military 
organizations. For this reason we can exclude extremely hierarchical 
network structures (top down), because irrespective to what level 
communication takes place, we adhere to Simmels (1964) argument that 
networks facilitate interaction and communication between actors (Simmels 
1964). As will be demonstrated below, our choice of the circle and star 
shape networks is based on the fact that they allow for different degrees of 
communication between EWC delegates. 
Star shape 
The notion of the star shape network in relation to EWCs has briefly been 
discussed in the work of Lecher et al (1998) and Whittall (2003), both 
works emphasizing that a situation arises in which an individual or a 
steering committee take up a central position through which the network 
communicates. However, these individuals should not be considered a 
“switchboard”, they do not connect different delegates together – rather 
they distribute information through the network – communication to a 
greater extent is an indirect experience for the majority of EWC delegates. 
Hence, with the exception of the once a year meeting EWC delegates 
neither come face-to-face with their counterparts from other sites or have 
direct access to each other on a regular basis. In addition, due to the fact that 
the central point in the star functions as a filter through which such 
information flows a danger prevails that information could be distorted. 
Whittall (2003), for example, has suggested that actors who take up the 
central point in the star might even censor the information which passes 
through the centre, this interpreted as a means of retaining the status quo 
already in place. 
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Circle shape 
In contrast to the star shape the circle encourages greater inter-
communication between the various nodes. Such an EWC is structured in a 
way which allows delegates to a greater extent to set the EWCs agenda. 
Although Bavelas (1950) discovered that the circle network was much 
slower in passing information on and responding to problems compared to 
the star shape structure, the former recorded much higher in terms of 
satisfaction. The latter we argue a key quality underpinning a delegates 
commitment to the EWC. 
Another important quality associated with more open communication flows 
involves the question of empathy. We contend that a sense of Gemeinschaft, 
which as we argue is a key quality of an EWC if it is to develop common 
and sustainable positions, is dependent on delegates not only understanding 
the problems of their counterparts but equally demonstrating a willingness 
to take responsibility for these same people. Seen from this perspective the 
EWC becomes an important structure through which delegates collectively 
pull together to influence management decisions. Thus, the horizontal 
outlook of employee representatives is neither the immediate locality, be 
this the plant, region or country where they are based, but the “European 
enterprise”. In short then, while the star shape is perceived to as possessing 
a quicker response rate and less prone to errors, the circle network is more 
likely to facilitate a greater bonding between delegates and with this a 
general sense of collective belonging. 
10.3. The case of BMW 
For over six years BMW’s stewardship of the Rover Group, 1994 to 2000, 
dominated the international press. Firstly, the take over of Britain’s last 
remaining car producer caught the imagination of the media, this step 
marking a major sea-change in BMW’s hitherto business strategy – the 
Munich based company no longer a niche player. Secondly, the turbulent 
years that followed BMW’s acquisition in 1994, made for a stream of 
negative headlines. Moreover, BMW’s struggle to become a global player 
ensured that its EWC, founded in 1996, became one of the most prominent 
EWCs of its time. The BMW EWC helped broker the introduction of 
working time accounts throughout the BMW group, stop the closure of 
Rover’s largest and least profitable plant, Longbridge, this on more than one 
occasion, and finally manage the eventual break-up of the Rover Group in a 
way that was partly acceptable to the British workforce. 
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These events, and the role played by BMW’s EWC have been well 
documented (Whittall 2007, 2004). For this reason we don’t wish to go over 
old trodden ground. Instead we will use this section to study why, 
irrespective of the positive role played by the EWC at times, the BMW 
EWC network structure was marked by certain limitations. 
The break-up of Rover 
We contend that the limited nature of the BMW EWC network can be 
explained by its “star shape” structure. This relates to what social network 
theory refers to as the question of centrality; what we refer to as the 
problem of centralisation, namely that the centre dominates the network. As 
Lecher et al (1998: 232) note, such a structure can be associated with 
disadvantages as the central node: 
… decides which information will be passed on and which will be 
held back… and with that secure their own position of power within 
the EWC. 
In the case of the BMW EWC network all information flowed through the 
chair’s office, an individual based at the headquarters in Munich. Some 
British respondents were very critical of this, as this they argued led to what 
Miller (1999) and Scholte (1998) refer to as the transparency/accountability 
deficit. The problem of centralisation, however, was not necessarily shared 
by their German and Austrian colleagues. A common position here existed 
whereby: 
At the moment it is not necessary for the chairs of the different 
German works councils to be in direct contact with England, and to 
influence things and so on. It (contact) is filtered. When this is 
necessary, it goes through the central office, and that is for the best, 
so that [the chair] can take control. This process has proven itself in 
Germany… (German BMW EWC delegate) 
German delegates’ support for this filtering process is the result of a number 
of factors. Firstly, their direct access to management. As other studies have 
demonstrated this relates to the fear on the part employee representatives 
within the home country that the EWC could threaten their special 
relationship to top management (Tuckman and Whittall 2002). Interestingly, 
Lücking et al (2007) argue that this is a major reason for explaining why 
many German representatives appear opposed to the foundation of EWCs – 
which as the authors note is a key problem of German multinationals. By 
functioning as the filter of information, especially between meetings, the 
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chair is able to not only to decide on what information is disseminated 
through the network, but equally they can reinforce their importance for 
management. 
Secondly, there prevailed a preference to impose the German system of 
industrial relations; in particular a preference for what Kahn-Freund (1979) 
refers to as “representative democracy”. This supports the Euro-pessimist 
position that the failure of the legislature to achieve a unified structure, i.e. 
the emphasis on subsidiarity throughout the EWCD, will lead EWCs 
becoming nothing more than extensions of national industrial relations 
practices. Hence, in terms of centrality, specifically the limited degree of 
interaction between all the nodes, German delegates seemed to favour such 
a structure. For the German delegates the motto was quite clearly, “why 
change a winning team?” 
The filtering role, though, was not confined to the chair alone. Another, sub-
level of centralisation existed, this involving the vice-chairs, in particular 
the head of the British delegation. Again the problem here was very much 
related to national practices. In line with the traditions of British industrial 
relations, the main spokesperson for British employees was a fulltime trade 
union officer. Convenors and shop stewards played very much a secondary, 
if any at all. German delegates critically noted that at EWC meetings the 
fulltime officer dominated proceedings. Even on the one occasion when he 
could not attend a meeting British lay delegates were not allowed to play a 
more active role, the fulltime officer in question ensuring that another 
officer stood in for him. For some British trade unions EWCs are seen as a 
potential threat to their position as an employee spokesperson, conscious 
that in countries like Germany the role of trade unions is restricted to sector 
level collective bargaining and hence by default they have limited access to 
the shop floor. For example, although the IG Metall helped facilitate the 
first contacts between Rover and BMW employee representatives, the IG 
Metall retrieving into the background once the BMW EWC was set up. 
All Rover lay officers, irrespective of union affiliation, were critical of the 
dominant role played by the fulltime union officer. A major concern of lay 
members related to their lack of involvement in drawing up the agenda: 
I am not happy with the ways things are going. I believe that [he-
British vice-chair] is at fault. Old [John] is a friend of mine, but I 
have told him that I believe before an EWC meeting is about to 
take place we should have a UK delegation meeting. We should 
have a special meeting to decide what goes on the agenda, fax him 
[chair] the agenda items that we want. That has never happened… 
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His is the problem of bureaucracy. They [fulltime officers] will say 
yes to you because they want to get out of this room and they want 
to get another point over to you about something else. But when it 
comes down to laying on the actual time and the release… they 
don’t leave any time for it. And I can say to you now that this is 
doing more damage to our relationship [to BMW German 
delegates] than anything else. We have got to have a structured 
works council. (British EWC member) 
The role fulfilled by the EWC officers ensured that they functioned as a 
buffer that impeded the development of an important bonding process 
between lay EWC members – a process necessary to achieve a sense of 
network cohesion. This became quite apparent in relation to the so-called 
steering committee. Designed to co-ordinate the work of the three 
respective countries, Austria, Germany and the UK, it never really met and 
if it did the results were seen as insufficient according to respondents. One 
respondent noted: 
There was this steering committee which would be [X] and the guy 
from [Y] and [Z] who were responsible for developing the agenda 
and the EWC. I think it is the case that you should not be just doing it 
on the phone. You should have a debate, tooing and throwing, get a 
real understanding of what the issues were. And that never 
happened. I say it never happened. If it happened once that is all. It 
should have been the case of flying off and, them flying here, see 
them… (Rover Convenor) 
Intermediate summary 
Although the BMW EWC agreement only made provision for one yearly 
meeting, this body had met on no less than three occasions by the end of 
1996 a tendency which would continue in the coming years. Although the 
regularity of such meetings was positive, it says very little about the quality 
of these transnational events. There was no evidence of Lecher’s (1998) 
notion of a “collective identity” developing, or what Tönnies (1972) refers 
to as a Gemeinschaft. EWC meetings were characterised by shallow plant 
reports rather than what Pieterse (1997: 57) refers to as ‘collective 
symbolism and discourse’, a bonding process which can be reached through 
common projects. 
By utilising Scholte’s (1998) notion of “democracy” (see Table 10.1.) the 
following observations can be made of the BMW EWC star shape network. 
Firstly, the overall structure would have to be characterised as unhealthy, a 
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fact that ensured that delegates were unable to achieve a “sustainable” 
transnational response to problems faced by the BMW Group as a whole. 
Table 10.1. Trust relations within EWCs 
Variable  Healthy  Unhealthy  
Representative  All delegates  Specific interests  
Accountable All delegates Specific interests  
Debate  Open Closed 
Transparency Open Closed 
Constitutional Inclusive  Exclusive 
Source: Scholte (1998); customised by the authors.  
In terms of representativeness, specific interests dominated EWC affairs. Too 
often the limited information that was gleaned from the BMW EWC network 
was instrumental in serving national needs. Although there was never a 
sustained period in which the EWC was used to promote whip-sawing, what 
Wills (2000) ironically calls “international nationalism”, neither was it used to 
advance common positions that would lay the foundations for more open and 
frequent interaction between the different network members. This was 
because the dominant role played by the EWC officers, a position supported 
by German delegates, ensured a limited level of debate, and a total lack of 
transparency. As a consequence there existed a small degree of what network 
analysis theory refers to as closeness, i.e. the interaction levels between 
members through which information can be accessed. For this reason, once 
the problems faced by British subsidiaries threatened to engulf German plants 
in 1999 and the much cosseted independence of BMW was placed in question 
(Whittall 2007), the tentative relations that had facilitated a degree of co-
ordination at times suddenly ceased. Instead of the German delegation using 
the EWC to debate the problem, German EWC delegates supported BMW 
management’s decision to break up the Rover Group at an extraordinary 
supervisory board meeting in March 2000. 
10.4. The case of GM – a circle network 
A conference or article on EWCs rarely goes by without some reference 
being made to the GM’s EWC. For many researchers and activists the GM 
Michael Whittall, Herman Knudsen and Fred Huijgen 
 
 
292 European Works Councils in complementary perspectives 
EWC has become the jewel in the EWC crown. Known as the European 
Employee Forum, the GM EWC represents the quintessential participatory 
EWC (Haipeter 2006; Bartmann and Blum-Geenen 2006). Its current status, 
however, masks the steep leaning curve it has had to climb to become a 
structure which is able to coordinate industrial action across Europe. 
Founded in 1996 under Article 13 of the European Works Council 
Directive, the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium (Haipeter 
2006; Pulignano 2005; Hancké 1998 and 2000), especially the closure of the 
Vauxhall Luton plant (UK) in 2000, marked a period in which the GM 
EWC was no different from many other EWCs struggling to come to terms 
with parochial pressures. 
In terms of GM’s EWC network structure the dominance of Germany 
initially, as in the case of BMW, ensured a high degree of centralisation and 
subsequently problems of closeness between EWC delegates. As a 
consequence the GM EWC represented a supranational structure in name 
only. In reality EWC delegates were more susceptible to playing 
management’s game of regime competition. 
According to our GM EWC respondent there were two factors which helped 
propel the GM EWC beyond a star shape network. Firstly, the shock 
associated with the Luton experience led to a galvanising effect amongst GM 
workers. This reflects Kotthoff’s (2007) assertion that the emergence of an 
EWC, one in which mutual interdependence prevails, may require delegates 
to be faced by “change and endangerment”. The arrival of a collective 
consciousness which stretches beyond the local according to Kotthoff (2007: 
180) involves a realisation that ‘What the Other does, and how he or she is 
doing, concerns me, for it has noticeable effects on me and vice versa.’ 
Secondly, the change in leadership which helped challenge the hegemonic 
role that the German chair had previously played was also significant. 
Bartmann (2005: 3) notes, for example, that for a period of time the 
Swedish EWC delegates ‘saw the EWC as partly an extension of German 
interests. In the meantime, however, there exists a stronger co-ordination 
also with Sweden.’ By achieving greater access this allowed for a greater 
sense of belonging, which in turn improved the legitimacy of the GM EWC. 
A master stroke here involved appointing a Belgium delegate to the position 
of EWC officer, i.e. someone from one of the smaller countries. 
Though the current EWC officers, three in all, the chair, vice-chair and 
EWC advisor/administrator, all represent central nodes through which 
information flows, such a structure does not appear symptomatic of the star-
shaped network that had prevailed earlier. There appears to have existed an 
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awareness that centralisation in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. As 
Bavelas (1950) has pointed out centralisation does have the benefit of both 
speeding up decision making processes and less susceptible to errors. 
However, the GM officers were also conscious, as will be demonstrated 
below, of the need to keep the issue of centralisation in-check and hence the 
need to ensure that not one individual or country is able to take up a 
dominant position. 
The chair and vice-chair, as well as a fulltime EWC administrator play two 
key roles: Firstly, they keep all EWC members and ancillary staff (members 
of various committees and working groups not elected to the EWC) 
informed of developments throughout the group. Secondly, through their 
activities they help procure what Kotthoff (2006) refers to as “Alltägliche 
Europäisierung” (day-to-day Europeanisation), i.e. that the day-to-day 
work of each of the European GM 18 plants is informed of the EWC’s 
position. This is not only achieved through an incessant flow of information 
made possible through such a medium as the GM Workers blog, but by the 
constant mobility of these key actors. The vice-chair, for example, 
calculates that 80% of their working week is donated to serving the EWC. A 
vast amount of work requires them to visit and inform the 18 plants of 
developments within GM personally. In fact mobility proves not only to be 
key factor in raising the profile of the EWC network, but equally it offers a 
human face to relations – two factors we argue that are essential in 
procuring network cohesion. 
Another structural factor which helped to open up the network as a means 
of ensuring that delegates were willing to buy-into a collective response to 
restructuring involved the development of working committees. This 
process of decentralisation, a key characteristic of the circle network, an act 
which promoted participation on the part of EWC delegates, helped procure 
common trans-national positions when addressing management. The most 
relevant bodies were the: 
• Steering Committee 
• Joint Delta group (plants that produce GM’s mid-size range, the 
Astra and Zafira ) 
• Manufacturing committee  
• Eastern European network 
• Engineering committee 
• High level committee (quasi-supervisory board) 
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The thought that has been put into challenging a too over-centralised 
network can be further gauged by a number of organisation developments 
that were implemented. One such development involved reconsidering how 
to structure a newsletter. The eventual solution referred to as the “constant 
newsletter”. Prior to the emergence of the constant newsletter plants were 
required to meet certain editorial deadlines. Unfortunately, most plants 
failed to submit information describing important developments that had 
unfolded within their plant or country. Subsequently the newsletter was 
dominated by certain countries. In challenging this problem it was agreed 
that delegates would circulate information through the network as events 
unfolded. As our GM EWC respondent notes: 
The new approach involves sending information as it happens; 
each plant [then] has to print this new news item and hang it out in 
the plant. The process of hanging it out on the wall can show, 
demonstrate, which plants are active, doing their job. 
A key factor here, one the GM EWC appears to encourage as often as 
possible, involves the issue of ‘peer pressure’. Peer pressure denotes a 
situation whereby EWC delegates feel inclined to follow-suit, i.e. not 
appearing less active in the EWC network than any of their counterparts at 
the other 17 GM plants. 
The complex and effective employee representative network that has 
evolved at GM Europe, in which the centre encourages its 30 delegates to 
be involved in running the EWC, has resulted in the GM EWC negotiating 
various European-wide collective agreements. These include, for example, 
agreements with management on corporate social responsibility (2002), 
restructuring (2004 and 2006) as well as a GM employee solidarity pledge 
against social dumping (2005). The resilience and worth of such a network, 
however, was put to the test in 2006 and 2007, when GM respectively 
closed the Azambuja plant in Portugal and tried to play the Delta plants off 
against each other. It is the first of these two issues that we now wish to 
consider in greater detail. 
Azambuja 
The benefit of a network characterised by a healthy degree of centrality 
which encourages nodes to play an active role in the network and one that 
can promote a common approach to problems of restructuring, became most 
evident in the dispute over the closure of the Azambuja plant in Portugal, 
2006. Although the GM EWC was unable to stop the eventual closure of the 
Portuguese plant, the combined activities of all 18 GM plants in Europe was 
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not in vain. Two important successes could be recorded according to the 
GM EWC. Firstly, the pressure brought to bear on management by the 
EWC strengthened the hand of the local negotiators. As a consequence the 
best redundancy package ever agreed within the automobile industry, 240% 
on top of what Portuguese employees were legally entitled to, was made 
possible. 
Secondly, and possibly more telling, the EWC was able to demonstrate its 
ability to coordinate a European-wide collective response, one unique in its 
breadth and duration. Our respondent proudly noted, 
Though it was a defeat GM knows that next time it will not be so easy. 
The way that the GM EWC coordinated the campaign to save the 
Portuguese plant says a lot about the way the network functions. On the 
one-hand the transparency that had been achieved through the process of 
decentralisation helped furnish the EWC with information that was essential 
in highlighting the kind of action each of the individual plants could be 
expected to undertake – this an acknowledgement of countries’ different 
traditions in terms of industrial action. It was known, for example, that 
strike action within the eastern European plants was something very new 
and for this very reason possibly a too high expectation to ask of workers in 
Hungary and Poland. As a means of customising the campaign three options 
were drawn up from which plants could chose from. These included: 
• Level 1: 24-hour strike 
• Level 2: Information events to stop production (indirect strike activity) 
• Level 3: Handing out leaflets 
Interestingly, although option three was designed to accommodate plants in 
Eastern Europe, the Szentgotthard plant in Hungarian opted for level two, 
stopping production on 23 June 2006 (Tóth and Neumann 2006). The fact 
that the Hungarian workers felt a deep sense of responsibility towards other 
nodes within the network demonstrates the durability of the GM EWC 
network. They did not want to appear to be the weakest link in the chain. 
Another key aspect of the strategy, one which exemplifies the intricacy of 
the network and consequently its Gemeinschaft character, involves the 
EWC sending observers to attend the event in question. In the case of 
Hungary, for example, an EWC delegate from the nearby Austrian plant 
represented the public face of the GM EWC. The presence of such 
individuals appears to have a solidifying and possibly even controlling 
effect (peer pressure) according to Whittall et al (2008). It helps remind, if 
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not the immediate workforce, certainly their representatives on the EWC, 
that they are members of a much lager family. 
Intermediate summary 
Within a ten-year period the GM EWC evolved into what Pulignano (2006) 
terms a “coordinative virtual network”, the exchange and collation of 
information used to facilitate collective action beyond national borders. GM 
EWC delegates have established a complex network of committees 
designed to refine the work of the EWC, a process that encourages specific 
informed responses as well as greater involvement in and identification with 
the EWC on the part of delegates. As a consequence, the GM EWC 
possesses two key qualities essential for it to function: centralisation and 
democracy. In this sense the GM EWC network could be considered a 
hybrid between the star and circle shape network. Although EWC officers 
understood the importance of having a central co-ordinating committee they 
were very conscious that the centre should not take on a hegemonic character. 
10.5. Summary 
The term network is widely used in studies on EWCs today. Unfortunately 
it has become a catch-all phrase which fails to acknowledge the different 
forms and internal structures which this European body may display. This 
chapter represents a first and somewhat modest attempt to rectify this 
deficit. Hopefully we have been able to demonstrate that only by studying a 
network’s contours, structure and web of communication is it possible to 
judge where a EWC is in its development. 
As the two case studies demonstrate the character/structure of an EWC 
network influences the ability of such a network to play an important role in 
an environment marked by ever increasing employment insecurity. In 
contrast to BMW delegates the GM EWC acknowledged the need to 
address the problem of centrality associated with the star shape network. 
According to Telljohann (2007) a defining factor here can concern the 
nationality of the enterprise in question, non-European multinationals being 
more likely to develop greater employee coordination because they are not 
hampered by the “home country” problem. Home country is a variable that 
decisively describes the BMW situation, in particular because German 
delegates had important access to top management. Though we accept there 
is some validity in this argument the problem of hegemony need not be 
restricted to the home country variable. In the case of GM the sheer size of 
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the German workforce ensured that a degree of hegemony prevailed for a 
period in the early years. 
What other factors then explain the different outcomes in, network structure 
at BMW and GM? Undoubtedly the major difference concerned the fact 
that the very existence of each and every one of the 18 GM plants was 
constantly under threat. As a result EWC delegates slowly began to commit 
themselves to an agenda which tried to “share the pain” - a term used by 
GM EWC delegates to refer to this strategy – instead of using this 
international body to promote purely local/national interests. However, 
commitment to each other in itself is not sufficient, like in all successful 
marriages a considerable amount of time and thought have to be invested in 
the cause. Relations not only have to develop a common aim, but they have 
to be intensive and prevalent at all times. 
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Chapter 11 
Cooperation versus competition:  
union and works council strategies in the Delta 
site-selection process at General Motors Europe 
Martin Bartmann and Veronika Dehnen 
11.1. Introduction 
The European Works Council of General Motors Europe defines its role far 
in excess of the rules and rights of the European Works Council directive. 
Whereas the directive provides the right of information and consultation for 
European Works Councils (EWCs), some EWCs – especially in the automotive 
industry – have changed their role and become negotiation partners for 
management (see e.g. Carley and Hall 2006; Eller-Braatz and Klebe 1998; 
Hancké 2000). In this article we analyse how employee representatives dealt 
with the so-called Delta site selection process. In this process the GM manage-
ment opened an existential competition among five European GM plants. 
The arguments and results presented in this article are the results of two 
empirical research projects conducted by the authors between 2006 and 
2007 and of the collaboration of one author in the GMEECO-project1. 
11.2. Site selection processes at General Motors 
It has become common practice for companies in the automotive industry to 
produce the same models in different plants and initiate competition of 
production between their plants. The management’s approach using internal 
market processes is to produce as much efficiency as possible. In most cases 
 
1  Veronika Dehnen analysed the Delta site selection process in her final diploma thesis (Rott, V. 
(2008): Europäische Kooperation und Solidarität. Eine Analyse der Bedingungen für 
Kooperation von Arbeitnehmervertretern am Beispiel der Delta Gruppe bei General Motors 
Europe. (Diplomarbeit) Münster: LIT-Verlag).  
 One part of the analysis of Martin Bartmann’s ongoing PhD research project is about labour 
relations at GME (title of the PhD-research-project: Labour relations in the automobile 
industry. A Swedish-German comparison). In 2006/2007 Martin Bartmann worked as a 
project assistant on the GMEECO-project (General Motors Europe Employee Cooperation). 
The project was funded by the EU (social dialogue) and coordinated by IG Metall. 
